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THE FOREST LEGACY PROGRAM: USING 
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS TO PRESERVE THE 
NORTHERN FOREST 
Laura S. Beliveau· 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1988, New England residents became aware that the stability 
that had once marked the ownership and management of the 26 
million acres of their Northern Forest was disappearing. 1 Diamond 
International, a wood products company, announced its plan to sell 
over a million acres of land in Maine, New York, New Hampshire, 
and Vermont.2 In response to this unusually large land sale, Con-
gress purchased 45 thousand acres of New Hampshire land for $12.75 
million. 3 Congress also authorized the United States Forest Service 
to conduct the Northern Forest Lands Study to examine ownership 
and use of the Northern Forest and to suggest proposals for pre-
serving the vast tracts of working forests that characterize Maine, 
New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont.4 The Forest Service 
published a report and recommended a variety of public and private 
responses to the crisis. 5 In response to Congress' attention to the 
issue, a Governors' Task Force established the Northern Forests 
Land Council(NFLC) to cooperate with the Northern Forest Lands 
Study and to recommend action to preserve the Northern Forest. 6 
• Production Editor, 1992-1993, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
1 Phyllis Austin, Battle for the Northern Forest, MAINE TIMES, August 30, 1991, at 2. 
• Sylvia Dodge, Forest Management Proves Controversial, VT. Bus. MAG., Sept. 1991, at 
32. 
3Id. 
4Id. 
o FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRICULTURE, NORTHERN FOREST LANDS STUDY 
REPORT SUMMARY 2 (1990). 
6Id. at 24. 
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Congress has given the NFLC funding, but has not explicitly autho-
rized the interstate agency. 7 
In 1990, Congress followed one of the recommendations of the 
Northern Forest Land Study8 by enacting the Forest Legacy Pro-
gram (Legacy Program). 9 The Legacy Prl>gram enables the federal 
government to purchase conservation easements to protect forest 
lands that face conversion to alternative uses. 10 
This Comment evaluates the various options available to local, 
state, and federal governments as they seek to balance private own-
ership, economic diversity, and ecological value in the Northern 
Forest. Section II looks at the problems in the Northern Forest and 
the shortcomings of traditional land use practices. Section III ex-
plores the Legacy Program and arguments propounded by the Pro-
gram's supporters and opponents. Section IV examines conservation 
easements and the legal challenges brought against them. Section V 
evaluates the Legacy Program's efficacy and proposes supplemen-
tary provisions to enhance the Legacy Program's prospects for suc-
cess. 
II. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL ROLE IN DETERMINING FOREST 
LAND USE 
A. The Economic Problem 
The greatest threats to the Northern Forest, according to many 
commentators, are widespread residential and recreational devel-
opment and abusive forestry practices. 11 Sporadic, poorly planned 
development in traditionally forested areas may result in the de-
struction of the ecosystems that the federal government wants to 
preserve. 12 
The impetus for the Legacy Program arose from the sudden and 
rapid sale of vast acres of industrially-owned Northern Forest 
lands. 13 In the past, paper companies and other industrial owners 
7 Francis W. Hatch, A Motley Crowd of Deceivers, CONSERVATION LAW FOUND. NEWSL., 
Winter, 1992, at 1, 3. 
S NORTHERN FOREST LANDS STUDY REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 5, at 15. 
916 U.S.C. § 2103c (Supp. 1992). 
10 S. Rep. No. 357, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 280 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
4934. 
II Austin, supra note 1, at 2. 
12 S. Rep. No. 357, supra note 10, at 280. 
13 See William Scheer, Vermont Timberland Looks Good to Buyers, VT. Bus. MAG., April 
1990, at 37 (citing Diamond Occidental Forest sale of 1.6 million acres in 1988). 
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had exercised stable forest land ownership practices. In the late 
1980s, however, the industrial landowners began selling their land 
to finance their other endeavors, to fullfill terms of corporate merg-
ers, to benefit from increased returns from other investments, and 
to profit from higher land prices. 14 Local and state measures thus 
far have been unable to prevent development and harsh logging 
practices in the Northern Forest. 15 
B. The Local Role 
Traditionally, municipalities use zoning, through the state's dele-
gation of its police power, to restrict landowners' use of their land. 16 
These restrictions are valid if they protect public health, welfare, or 
morals. 17 Local governments generally zone by dividing land into 
districts. 18 The governments then assign each district certain per-
missible uses. 19 
Zoning originally was both a codification of, and a response to, 
nuisance law.20 Local governments soon began to use zoning to pro-
tect residents' economic interests in their property; often these mea-
sures resulted in excluding less affluent people who were unable to 
afford homes in the town. 21 Local governments also used zoning to 
preserve open space.22 For example, a local government could use 
large lot zoning, minimum floor space requirements, and prohibition 
14 See Phyllis Austin, Emotions Are High as Debate over Northern Forests Continues, 
MAINE TIMES, Aug. 30, 1991, at 6. 
15 Christine Kukka, Strategies for Saving the Northern Forest, MAINE TIMES, Aug. 30, 
1991, at 21; National Aud. Society et aI., A National Treasure Under Seige, THE NORTHERN 
FOREST ADVOCATE, Winter, 1992, at 1. 
16 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (constitutionality of 
zoning); Charles E. Roe, Innovative Techniques to Preserve Rural Land Resources, 5 ENVTL. 
AFF. 419, 421-23 (1976). 
17 See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1926), reprinted in 
DAVID CALLIES & ROBERT FREILICH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 5-9 (1985). 
18 DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 152 (2nd. ed. 1988). 
19 Id. 
20 CALLIES & FREILICH, supra note 17, at 2; MANDELKER, supra note 18, at 4 (describing 
zoning as elaboration of nuisance doctrine that had emerged from disputes between residential 
neighborhoods and incoming commercial and industrial uses). 
21 See Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 89 A.2d 693, 701 (N.J. 1952) (Oliphant, J., 
dissenting); Robert H. Freilich & Linda Kirts Davis, Saving the Land: The Utilization of 
Modern Techniques of Growth Management to Preserve Rural and Agricultural America, 13 
URB. LAW. 27, 30 (1981); Orlando E. Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time 
Has Passed, 36 ME. L. REV. 261, 264-65 n.13 (1984). 
22 Freilich & Davis, supra note 21, at 30. 
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of industrial uses as tools to conserve open space and to restrict 
development.23 
Zoning, however has not protected rural lands from develop-
ment. 24 Even when perfectly implemented, regulations such as large 
lot restrictions25 have contributed to a serious problem with urban 
sprawl. 26 Local governments, commentators note, have been less 
than consistent about designing, implementing, and enforcing land-
use regulations.27 The result has been a system of land-use provisions 
that excludes lower income people28 and unpopular facilities,29 fails 
to address regional environmental problems,30 and leaves landowners 
uncertain about how they may use their property, thereby discour-
aging them from putting their property to the most economically 
and socially benefical uses.31 
c. The State Role 
States often seek to overcome local shortcomings in regulating 
land use. One method states may use is land banking. The state 
purchases land outright in order to exercise absolute control over 
environmentally sensitive tracts of land and to accumulate land for 
state parks.32 In the United States, land banking is a fairly uncom-
mon practice. 33 States must acquire environmentally sensitive land34 
for courts to uphold the land's condemnation as a valid public pur-
23 See Nat'l Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 611 (1965)(four acre minimum lot 
size); Lionshead Lake, 89 A.2d at 694-95(minimum floor space); Freilich & Davis, supra note 
21, at 30. 
24 Many commentators have criticized the ineffectiveness of local zoning. See e.g., Freilich 
& Davis, supra note 21, at 30; Charlotte E. Thomas, The Cape Cod National Seashore: A 
Case Study of Federal Administrative Control Over Traditionally Local Land Use Decisions, 
12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 225, 231-32 (1985). 
25 Ordinances that require lots of at least a certain size, such as one acre or more, for single 
family residential development. MANDELKER, supra note 18, at 152. 
26 See id. at 393; Freilich & Davis, supra note 21, at 29. 
27 See, e.g., Roe, supra note 16, at 421; Thomas, supra note 24, at 232. 
28 See, e.g., S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 
723 (N.J. 1975); Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board of Upper Providence Township, 382 A.2d 
105, 111 (Pa. 1977), Freilich & Davis, supra note 21, at 31. 
29 JOHN DELAFONS, LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 19-20, 29, 114 (2nd ed. 
1969); Delogu, supra note 21, at 262. Delogu discusses how municipality-based land use policies 
fail to address important social issues. Id. 
30 Delogu, supra note 21, at 262. 
31 I d. at 263. 
32 Freilich & Davis, supra note 21, at 42; Roe, supra note 16, at 441. 
33 Roe, supra note 16, at 442. 
34 Environmentally sensitive areas include, for example, those areas which serve as habitat 
for threatened or endangered plants and animals; provide recreational opportunities for resi-
dents and visitors; contain undeveloped wetlands, lakes, and rivers; or display outstanding 
natural features. NORTHERN FOREST LANDS STUDY REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 5, at 15. 
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pose.35 The high costs of acquiring full title to land prevents this tool 
from meeting the public need for restrictions on development. 36 
Moreover, once a state government purchases land, it must pay the 
costs of maintaining the land.37 This practice may be expensive for 
the government and may not be the most effective use of the financial 
resources the state can allocate for conservation. 38 
A state's second tool is using the police power to protect natural 
resources through regulation. For example, states have passed laws 
restricting development in environmentally sensitive areas39 and di-
recting municipalities to consider open space as an important public 
purpose.40 
Each of the four states holding Northern Forest land has taken 
some measures to protect its forested areas. 41 For example, the 
states have conducted studies to assess the forest's status.42 Maine 
formed a Land Use Regulation Commission to bring sound planning 
and zoning provisions to unorganized and deorganized townships-
areas which are not located within a city, town, or Indian reserva-
tion.43 New York created the Adirondack and Catskill Parks and 
restricted residential development and industrial growth in these 
areas. 44 
Recently, however, northeastern states have faced two challenges 
in their efforts to preserve open space. First, the recession has 
depleted the states' abilities to finance outright acquisitions and 
other environmental programs. 45 Second, property owners have be-
gun to challenge state interference in court. After a long period of 
36 Roe, supra note 16, at 442. 
36 Freilich & Davis, supra note 21, at 42. 
37 Ross D. Netherton, Environmental Conservation and Historic Preservation Through 
Recorded Land-Use Agreements, 14 REAL PROP., PROB. AND TR. J. 540, 542 (1979). 
38 See John Baden, Privatizing Wilderness Lands: The Political Economy of Harmony and 
Good Will, in PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC LANDS 53 (Phillip N. Truluck, ed., 1983). 
39 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 685-A(I)(1981); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 24-
0701, 24-0903 (McKinney 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(I)(F), (8)(A}--(9)(C)(I984). 
40 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4326 (Supp. 1992); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW 
§ 247 (McKinney 1986). 
41 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 681-689 (1981 & Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 220 (1-7)(1989); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 9-0101 to 9-1503 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 
1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 2621 (1984). 
42 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 681 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 702 (1984). 
43 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 681-689 (1981 & Supp. 1992). In addition, Maine has 
mandated that each municipality adopt a growth management program. Id. tit. 30-A, § 4324. 
This mandate increases state control over local land use decisions because the state assists 
municipalities in formulating programs and may review the final product. Id. tit. 30-A, § 4341. 
44 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 9-0101 to -0109 (Conso!. 1984). 
45 See Richard Andrews, Landowners Offered Forest Legacy Plan, 10 VT. Bus. MAG., Sept. 
1991, at 40. 
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deference to state action,46 courts have begun to find state-imposed 
restrictions to be takings for which the government must compensate 
the landowner. 47 In an era of government indebtedness, decision-
makers have refrained from promoting any actions that cost money; 
thus, faced with the possibility of court-ordered compensation to 
property owners for decreased land values resulting from regulatory 
action, land-use planners and legislators may feel inhibited in their 
efforts to restrict land use for goals such as sound planning or 
environmental preservation. 48 
Even where state and local land-use restrictions are successful, 
these regulations often fail to preserve stability in the ownership 
and use of rural land. Some economists who observe property law 
have noted that state-level decisions about land use tend to be im-
perfect because, in their assessments of land uses' costs and benefits, 
state government officials focus on an area too small to encompass 
the true impact of regulatory action.49 Thus, when a political bound-
ary fails to conform to the region over which the costs and benefits 
of an activity are distributed, decisions about land use are likely to 
burden those areas outside the political boundary. 50 
D. The Federal Role 
Just as a state may intervene when local land-use practices fail to 
meet the state's needs, the federal government may intervene when 
state and local measures fail to address national interests. Environ-
46 See Marcia Coyle, Property Revival, THE NAT'L L.J., January 27, 1992, at 42. 
47 See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987). In First English 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), the Court did 
not resolve the question of whether a regulation had been a taking. 482 U.S. at 312. The 
Court said that if a taking had occurred, the government would have to compensate the 
landowner for even a temporary deprivation in the use of the property. [d. at 322. Changing 
the regulation alone would not be an adequate remedy. [d. See Coyle, supra note 46, at 1, 42 
(discussing three "economic rights" cases before 1992 U.S. Supreme Court). 
4B First English, 482 U.S. at 321; Agins v. Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 31 (Cal. 1979). 
49 See Fred Goldberg, Equalization of Municipal Services: The Economics of Serrano and 
Shaw, 82 YALE L.J. 89 (1972), reprinted in BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, ed., THE ECONOMIC 
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 247, 252 (1975); Christopher K. Lehman & Robert H. 
Nelson, The Rise of Managerial Federalism, 12 ENVTL. L. 981, 998-1000 (1982). 
50 See FRED P. BOSSELMAN & DAVID R. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE 
CONTROL (1971), quoted in CALLIES & FREILICH, supra note 17, at 901 (local governments 
tend to maxi:nize their own tax bases and minimize their own social problems without regard 
to what happens outside of their borders); Goldberg, supra note 49, at 252 (spillover between 
political boundaries in theory creates non-optimal allocation of resources and in practice may 
give rise to substantial inefficiency). 
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mental concerns, especially water and air pollution, have been the 
major basis for federal intervention in land-use decisions since the 
1970s.51 
The federal government has provided incentives for denser sub-
urban growth to curb urban sprawl by funding sewer projects. 52 The 
United States Environmental Protection Agency's role in imple-
menting federally enforced statutes such as the Clean Air Act53 and 
the Clean Water Act54 has decreased local governments' attempts to 
lure polluting industries to their states by promising lax environ-
mental enforcement, and has given the federal government a prom-
inent and ongoing position in state and local land-use decisions. 55 In 
addition, in some western parts of the country, the federal govern-
ment has been a major purchaser of wilderness lands. 56 The federal 
government also has attempted to address concerns over the dis-
appearance of open space by giving deductions to taxpayers who 
donate land to trusts held by qualified charitable organizations. 57 
III. THE FOREST LEGACY PROGRAM: THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A. The Program Defined 
In 1990, Congress sought to combine many of the actors who play 
a role in land use and conservation decisions. The Legacy Program, 
part of the 1990 Farm Bill, authorizes the United States Forest 
Service (USFS) to designate and to protect forest lands that are 
environmentally important and are threatened by conversion to non-
forest uses. 58 The Legacy Program also authorizes the USFS to use 
51 Neal Roberts & Otto Hetzel, The I'IU3vitable Accretion: Federal and State Takeover of 
Land Use Control, 3 URB. L. AND POL'y 105, 108-10 (1980). 
52 Id. at 109. 
53 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988). 
64 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). 
65 Roberts & Hetzel, supra note 51, at 109. 
56 National forests comprise 32.0 percent of national land area, 48.9 percent of Oregon land 
area. Clark Binkley & Perry Hagenstein, Policy Alternatives for Conserving the North Woods, 
in CONSERVING THE NORTH WOODS: ISSUES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF FOR-
ESTED LANDS IN NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND AND NEW YORK 9-10 (Clark Binkley & Perry 
Hagenstein eds., 1989). 
57 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (1988); Janet L. Madden, Comment, Tax Incentives for Land Conser-
vation, The Charitable Contribution Deduction for Gifts of Conservation Ease7'lU3nts, 11 B.C. 
ENVT'L. AFF. L. REV. 105, 106 (1983). 
58 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(a) (Supp. 1992). 
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conservation easements59 and other mechanisms to protect and con-
serve forest areas. 60 
The USFS is authorized to acquire from willing landowners both 
land in fee simple and interests in land, such as conservation ease-
ments and rights of public access.61 Under the Legacy Program, the 
USFS alone will hold the title to these interests.62 When acquiring 
lands through the Legacy Program, the USFS must specify the 
environmental values it is seeking to protect, the types of activities 
landowners will conduct, and the effects those activities will have 
on the land. 63 
The Legacy Program gives the USFS one year to establish a 
program in the Northeast and in Washington.64 For other areas of 
the nation, states must prepare an assessment that demonstrates 
how their region would benefit from implemenation of the Legacy 
Program before the USFS will begin a program in the area.65 Con-
gress has specified that it wants to enroll in the Legacy Program 
environmentally significant regions and lands that face conversion 
from forest uses into residential, recreational, or industrial uses.66 
Congress has given priority to forest lands that have special scenery, 
provide recreational opportunities for the region, contain valuable 
animal species, and hold riparian land. 67 
The USFS does not have authority to acquire land outside of 
previously designated Legacy Program areas without consent of the 
legislature of the state in which the land lies.68 In addition, no forest 
land in New York may be part of the Legacy Program unless the 
political subdivision where the land is located agrees to participate. 69 
The USFS may permit commercial activity, such as timber manage-
ment, on Legacy Program land as long as the activity is consistent 
with the Legacy Program's values. 70 
69 A conservation easement is created when a grantor sells certain specified development 
rights in a piece of property but retains all unspecified property rights. See Madden, supra 
note 57, at 118-19; see also infra notes 106-111, 121-24, and accompanying text. 
60 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(a) (Supp. 1992). 
61 [d. § 2103c(c). 
62 [d. 
63 [d. § 2103c(d). 
64 [d. § 2103c(d)(2). 
66 [d. A state must establish a State Forest Stewardship Advisory Committee to work with 
the Forest Service to delineate lands it wants to enroll in the Legacy Program. [d. 
66 [d. 
fYI [d. 
68 [d. § 2103c(g). 
69 H. 8088, 102nd Congo 1st Sess. (1991). 
70 16 U.S.C. 2103c(h)(1). 
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In purchasing forest land, the USFS shall pay fair market value 
for Legacy easements.71 Furthermore, the USFS, to the extent 
practical, may not pay for the entire program with more than sev-
enty-five percent federal funds. 72 
The statute originally authorized the USFS to purchase reserved 
interest deeds as the Legacy Program's primary conservation tool. 73 
Reserved interest deeds are conveyances of partial interests in land, 
whereby the grantor retains only the rights to the land that he or 
she specifies; all other rights go to the buyer, in this case the gov-
ernment. 74 Because landowners might be less willing to sell reserved 
interest deeds, the USFS also will use the more traditional conser-
vation easements by which the grantor specifies the development 
rights to be sold and retains all unspecified rights. 75 
B. Sources of Public Support and Criticism 
The Legacy Program's goal is to encourage continued private 
ownership of forest lands and industrial owners' current commercial 
practices while preserving the environmental quality of the region. 76 
Response to the Legacy Program has been strong from both people 
in support of the plan and from groups opposing it. Supporters 
emphasize the need for action to preserve the resources of the N orth-
ern Forest; opponents stress their resistance to governmental inter-
ference in the region and the potential abrogation of private property 
rights. 
Legacy Program supporters see great potential in the project. 77 
Because more than eighty-five percent of land in the Northern For-
est is held privately,78 purchases by the federal government of con-
servation easements from voluntary landowners may be an efficient 
tool to prevent subdivision and development of up to 150 thousand 
acres of Northern Forest land. 79 In addition, the proponents support 
the sense of cooperation that the Legacy Program may foster by 
71 Id. § 2103c(j)(1). 
72 Id. § 2103c(j)(2). 
73 See Forest Service, U.S. Dep't. of Agriculture, Forest Legacy Program Issues: Questions 
and Answers, Sept. 9, 1991, at 3. 
74 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(k)(1) (1988). 
75 See Forest Service, supra note 72, at 3. 
76 Forest Service, U.S. Dep't. of Agriculture, Final Forest Legacy Program Implementa-
tion Guidelines, June 4, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Final Guidelines]. 
77 Tom Lepisto, Vision Becomes Action, ApPALACHIA, Sept. 1991, at 10. 
78Id. 
79 Id. 
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encouraging public officials, private landowners, and conservation 
groups to work together in creating, conveying, and maintaining 
conservation easements. 80 Legacy Program supporters also feel that 
the project can show New England residents that the federal gov-
ernment's presence can help the region.81 They are optomistic that 
once local residents see the benefits of the Legacy Program, such as 
reduced damage to the forests and better jobs, then they will be less 
hostile to the idea of outright land ownership by federal and state 
governments. 82 
Few supporters, however, feel that the Legacy Program alone is 
sufficient to protect the Northern Forest. They view the Legacy 
Program as part of a multi-faceted approach to preserving the N orth-
ern Forest region's ecology.83 To address Northern Forest preser-
vation completely, many supporters feel, will require outright ac-
quisition of land, conservation easements, and improved local and 
state land-use regulations. 84 
Sensitive to antipathy from private property rights advocates, 
Legacy Program proponents point out that because the easement 
grantor acts voluntarily and continues to possess the land, private 
ownership is more effectively maintained than it would be if the 
government condemned the land or purchased it in fee simple.85 In 
spite of the voluntary nature of the Legacy Program, its passage 
has stirred up vocal opposition from individual landowners in the 
80 See Lisa Capone, Managing Change, ApPALACHIA, Sept., 1991, at 23,25; Lowell Krasner, 
remarks at the New England Environmental Conference (March 21, 1992). 
81 Krasner, supra note 80. 
P2 Id. 
83 See Jennifer Melville, Remarks at the New England Environmental Conference (March 
21, 1992). 
84 See id.; Nat'l Aud. Society, et. al., Saving the Northern Forest: An Issue of National 
Importance, Oct. 22, 1991, at 6-15 (advocating authorization and funding of Northern Forest 
Lands Council; federal and state acquisition of public land and interests in land; stronger state 
and local regulations to prevent land conversion; and programs to improve economic oppor-
tunities, public health, education, and social services in local communities). 
Some conservationists believe that Legacy Program easements will be helpful in preventing 
development, but inadequate to prevent industrial landowners from practicing damaging forest 
management, such as clearcutting or using unsafe levels of herbicides. Kukka, supra note 15, 
at 22. Because conservation easements can cost up to 80% of the land's full purchase price, 
some environmentalists worry that easements may not be the best way to conserve the 
Northern Forest from all of its potential threats. Id.("'The cost of easements are extraordi-
narily high ... and they don't do anything to protect the land from mismanagement and other 
activities, including gravel extraction, road construction, clearcutting and herbicides that 
degrade wildlIfe habitat. You wonder if these easements are really a good deal for the 
American taxpayer?"')(quoting Jym St. Pierre, director of the Maine Woods Project of the 
Wilderness Society). 
85 See S. Rep. No. 357, supra note 10 at 280, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4934. 
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Northeast pilot program area. 86 Several groups, including the John 
Birch Society, have objected at public hearings. 87 One group has filed 
a lawsuit in N ew York to oppose the Legacy Program's implemen-
tation in the Adirondack Park region. 88 
Private property rights advocates are concerned about the federal 
government becoming involved with Northeastern preservation is-
sues. They fear the Legacy Program will facilitate increased federal 
involvement in local land-use decisions. 89 They are not pleased with 
the details of the Legacy Program's statutory language and are even 
more disturbed by the statute's guidelines. 90 They believe, despite 
the Legacy Program's voluntary nature, that the program leaves 
open opportunities for forced acquisition of environmentally sensitive 
lands. 91 Private property rights advocates also argue that the Legacy 
Program's criteria for determining the eligibility of particular parcels 
are too vague.92 Such vague criteria, they assert, will lead to the 
possibility that the USFS will include vast expanses of land in the 
program. 93 
In addition, private property rights advocates also protest that 
the Legacy Program exhibits a lack of respect for property rights. 
For example, Legacy Program map provisions require that a state 
that applies to enter some of its land into the Legacy Program must 
indicate ecosystem boundaries, but need not make any note of land-
owner boundaries.94 Private property rights advocates argue that 
this omission reflects the Legacy Program's preference for ecological 
values over private property rights.95 Private property rights ad-
vocates also protest the role of private land trusts in administering 
portions of the program. These trusts, they charge, lack political 
accountability. 96 
86 Austin, supra note 1, at 4--5. 
87 Northern Forest Lands, NEW ENGLAND SIERRAN, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 4. 
88 Buskirk v. Adirondack Park Agency, No. 401-91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Essex Cty. filed Aug. 
13, 1991). 
B9 Forest Funding Okayed: Solomon Ends Opposition, Gannett News Service, Oct. 9, 1991, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. 
90 See, e.g., Extension o/Comment Period Sought on Forest Preservation Progmm, UPI, 
Aug. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. 
91 See id. 
92 Maine Conservation Rights Institute, Comments on Forest Legacy Implementation Draft 
Guidelines 2 (Aug. 17, 1991) (on file with the Maine Conservation Rights Institute, Lubec, 
ME)[hereinafter MCRI Comments]. 
98 [d . 
.. [d. at 3. 
95 [d. 
96 [d. at 4. See also Pacific Legal Foundation, Comments on the U.S. Forest Service's Draft 
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Advocates of private property rights also criticize the guidelines 
for permitting a regional organization such as the Northern Forest 
Lands Council to conduct multi-state identification of Forest Legacy 
areas. 97 Federal and interstate roles in administering the Legacy 
Program may abrogate state sovereignty and deny opportunities for 
meaningful input from local residents, who the Legacy Program's 
policies directly affect. 98 The private property rights advocates also 
object because the Legacy Program's implementation proceedings 
do not require notice; citizens cannot know how the Legacy Program 
affects their communities and their property. 99 
Finally, private property rights advocates consider the Legacy 
Program to be part of a trend toward federal intervention in local 
land-use regulation. 10o They anticipate that the program's studies 
are just the beginning of greater federal regulation of the forests. 101 
Private property rights advocates fear that the government will use 
the Legacy Program's studies as support for condemning interests 
in land as opposed to relying on voluntary sales of easements. 102 
Some people fear the federal government will coerce landowners to 
convey their development rights or to sell full title of key parcels in 
order to create a national park. 103 Private property rights advocates 
maintain that the Legacy Program's enactment is part of a trend to 
devalue private property rights in favor of public use or environ-
mental protection. 104 Private property rights advocates, however, 
might accept a conservation easement program managed at the local 
level because they believe that local officials are more willing to 
accept input from the local residents who will be directly affected 
by preservation schemes and that voters can hold local decision-
makers accountable for their proposals. 105 
Implementation Guidelines for the Forest Legacy Program, at 2 (Aug. 4, 1991)(on file with 
the Maine Conservation Rights Institute, Lubec, ME). 
97 MCRI Comments, supra note 92, at 3. 
98 See id. at 3. 
99 Id. at 4. 
100 Letter from Robert Voight, President, Maine Conservation Rights Institute, to the 
Director of the Cooperative Forestry Staff, Forest Service, U.S. Dep't. of Agriculture (Aug. 
17, 1991) (on file with Maine Conservation Rights Institute, Lubec, ME). 
101 Austin, supra note 14, at 4. 
102 MCRI Comments, supra note 92, at 3 (requesting local referenda in every municipality 
containing Forest Legacy area). 
103 Austin, supra note 14, at 4. 
104 See MCRI Comments, supra note 92, at 2. 
105 See id. at 3. 
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IV. FEDERAL PURCHASE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: A 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. The History and Description of Easements 
A conservation easement is an agreement a landowner makes to 
restrict the development of his or her property.106 Traditionally, an 
easement may be either affirmative or negative; and either appur-
tenant or in groSS.107 An affirmative easement allows the easement 
holder to enter the land or to perform acts upon it or both.108 In 
contrast, the holder of a negative easement may restrict the land-
owner's use of the land.109 Easements appurtenant give rights by 
virtue of neighboring land, while easements in gross give rights to 
a person or corporation whether or not the recipient owns nearby 
land. 110 Thus, conservation easements are usually negative ease-
ments in gross because they give the easement holders the right to 
restrict the landowners' development and exploitation of the land 
regardless of whether the easement holder owns neighboring land. III 
Property owners initially used easements as agreements to enter 
upon each other's property.112 Later, judicially created prescriptive 
easements permitted common rights of way to remain in the public 
domain. 113 Governments began to use easements as a tool in the 
1930s,114 and they have gained popularity over time. In 1959, for 
example, California began to purchase scenic easements. 115 In the 
1960s, the federal government authorized national easement pur-
chases by enacting the Highway Beautification Act116 and the Land 
106 JANET DIEHL & THOMAS s. BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 5 
(1988). 
107 Netherton, supra note 37, at 560 (1979). 
108 [d. at 560. 
109 [d. 
110 Kemble Hagennan Garrett, Comment, Conservation Easements: The Greening of Amer-
ica?, 73 Ky. L. J. 255, 257 (1984-85). 
111 [d. Some conservation easements may be both negative and affirmative if the public is 
given access to the land. Even negative easements may include minimal privileges such as 
allowing the easement holder to enter upon the land to monitor or to maintain its conditions. 
Netherton, supra note 37, at 560. 
112 Netherton, supra note 37, at 544. 
113 A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 266-67 (1986). 
114 Jeffrey A. Biackie, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of Changed Conditions, 
40 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1190 (1989). 
116 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6950-6954 (West 1980). 
116 P.L. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028 (1965). 
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and Water Conservation Fund Act.l17 In 1964, the federal govern-
ment enacted a tax code provision to allow a charitable contribution 
deduction for the donation of a conservation easement, thereby pro-
viding a financial incentive for landowners to donate their develop-
ment rights. 118 
Governmental use of conservation easements for environmental 
preservation has increased noticeably in recent years. 119 Both federal 
and state governments have begun to purchase less-than-fee inter-
ests in land instead of full title as a more economical means of 
furthering public purposes. 120 The sale of a conservation easement 
means that the landowner agrees to surrender certain rights in the 
land-usually rights to develop the land or to change its existing 
character-in exchange for money.121 The easement's fair market 
value equals the worth of the land without restrictions less the resale 
price of the land bearing the restrictions. 122 State law generally 
requires the landowner to record the easement arrangement with 
the property's deed. 123 As a result of the easement transaction, the 
landowner sacrifices certain interests in the land, but retains the 
right to possess and use the land in accordance with the terms of 
the easement. 124 
B. Legal Problems that May Arise 
While Congress has tried to anticipate and to address many com-
mon pitfalls of long-term restrictions on property,125 a program of 
permanent conservation easements may pose legal problems in the 
future. 126 The major legal issues include the USFS' constitutional 
and statutory authority to acquire partial interests in land, the 
courts' willingness to honor conservation easements, citizen standing 
117 P.L. 88-578, 78 Stat. 897 (1965). 
118 Blackie, supra note 113, at 1191. 
119 CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 920 (1985); Neil D. Ham-
ilton, Legal Authority for Federal Acquisition of Conservation Easements to Provide Agri-
cultural Credit Relief, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 477, 485 (1985). 
120 See Madden, supra note 57, at 105. 
121 [d. at 118-19. 
122 [d. at 262. 
123 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 477(1) (West 1988)(easement must be created 
by written instrument); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:3a (1992); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-
f(2)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261-a(2)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.Y. 
VILLAGE LAW § 7-701(2)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 341(a) (1989); 
Netherton, supra note 37, at 556. 
124 Garrett, supra note 110, at 257. 
125 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(k)(2). 
126 See Roe, supra note 16, at 435. 
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to sue for the failure to enforce the terms of an easement, and the 
status of a conservation easement if the surrounding area changes 
or if landowners seek to amend the conservation easements' terms. 
Opponents may claim easements are unconstitutional because they 
are gifts to private persons. 127 Addressing this question in 1980, the 
Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the constitutional validity of 
a county's program to purchase rural farmland development 
rights. 128 In Louthan v. King County,l29 plaintiffs challenged the 
program by claiming that buying private landowners' development 
rights violated a constitutional prohibition130 against using public 
funds for private interests. 131 The court, however, declared that the 
ability to develop land is a valuable property right. 132 The court went 
on to state that the county received valuable consideration when it 
exchanged money for development rights and thus did not make a 
gift in disbursing such payments. 133 
Similarly, the Legacy Program's statutory authority to purchase 
easements is likely to stand. 134 Both federal and state governments 
have authorized or acknowledged conservation easements as a pres-
ervation tool. Maine, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont all 
have conservation easement statutes that permit landowners to sell 
their development rights to charitable organizations. 135 In the past, 
the federal government has authorized its agencies to acquire inter-
ests in real property for a variety of conservation purposes. 136 While 
not always necessary for federal land acquisition programs,137 the 
Legacy Program requires state government consent before the 
USFS can acquire interests within the state's borders. l38 
One legal problem that a state consent requirement raises is the 
validity of an easement program when a state revokes its initial 
grant of authorization. The United States Supreme Court has held 
127 CALLIES & FREILICH, supra note 17, at 880. 
128 Louthan v. King County, 617 P.2d 977,980 (Wash. 1980). 
129 617 P.2d 977 (Wash. 1980). 
130 W A. CONST. Art. 8, § 7. 
131 Louthan, 617 P.2d at 978. 
132ld. at 981 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978». 
133 ld. at 981; see Thomas Grier, Comment, Conservation Easements: Michigan's Land 
Preservation Tool of the 1990s, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 193,211 (1991). 
134 Garrett, supra note 110, at 211. 
135 ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 33, §§ 476-479-B (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:45-
47 (1992 & Supp. 1992), §§ 79-A:l, 15-21 (1991 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 247 
(McKinney 1986); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 10, §§ 6301-6309 (1984 & Supp. 1992). 
136 See Hamilton, supra note 119, at 493, 524-25(provides table of federal statutes author-
izing acquisition of less than fee interests in property). 
137 ld. at 493. 
138 16 U.S.C. 2103(g) (Supp. 1992). 
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that a state may not revoke consent once granted. 139 In North Dakota 
v. United States,140 the Governor of North Dakota had consented to 
the Secretary of the Interior's acquisition of easements over wet-
lands to preserve waterfowl breeding and nesting grounds. 141 The 
Supreme Court declared that the United States has the power to 
acquire land for valid national interests with or without state con-
sent.142 Congress' addition of the state consent provision, however, 
limited that federal authority.143 Although Congress was silent on 
the issue of a state's revocation of consent, the Court decided that 
the statute did not allow incumbent governors to revoke their con-
sent once granted. 144 
A second possible legal pitfall of the Legacy Program is the tra-
ditional hostility common law courts have toward permanent restric-
tions on land rights. 145 State law is not necessarily applicable to 
disputes over easements held by the federal government. Conser-
vation easements that arise under federal law, however, may provide 
sufficient national interest to warrant federal jurisdiction and federal 
law. 146 
The Supreme Court determined in North Dakota that because the 
litigation evolved from land acquisition under a federal regulatory 
program, it involved significant federal issues; thus, the federal 
courts were the appropriate body to handle the choice of law ques-
tion. 147 The court might apply state law, but not if it was hostile to 
national interests. 148 Thus, the Court did not apply a North Dakota 
statute that restricted the terms of federally owned conservation 
easements. The court deemed the legislation hostile to national in-
terests in bird preservation. 149 The Supreme Court held that a state 
may not impose restrictions on the easement agreements under a 
139 See North Dakota v. U.S., 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1983). 
140 460 U.S. 300 (1983). 
141 Id. at 301. The governor's consent was required in the Migratory Bird Conservation Act: 
'''no land shall be acquired with moneys from the migratory bird conservation fund unless the 
acquisition thereof has been approved by the Governor of the state or the appropriate state 
agency.'" Id. at 303 n.3 (quoting Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 715k-5 (1988». 
142 Id. at 310. Valid statutory purposes include protecting bird habitats. Acquisition may be 
by purchase or condemnation. Id. at 309-10. 
143 Id. at 310. 
144 Id. at 314. 
145 Hamilton, supra note 119, at 502. 
146 North Dakota v. U.S., 460 U.S. 300, 318 (1983). 
147Id. 
148Id. 
149 I d. at 321. 
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federal conservation program. 150 Once granted, a state can neither 
revoke nor restrict its consent to a federal acquisition program. 151 
The next legal issue is who, other than the parties to the easement 
agreement, has standing to sue to enforce an easement's terms or 
to challenge the site of a granted easement. The courts in considering 
similar problems have used the standards delineated in the Admin-
istrative Procedures Act and Article III of the United States Con-
stitution. 152 For example, in National Audubon Society v. Hodel,153 
the Audubon Society had standing to challenge a land exchange 
because its members claimed to have aesthetic, scientific, and rec-
reational interests in the preservation of an island involved in the 
exchange. 154 The group's members did not need to have a property 
interest in the land affected,155 they only needed interests that the 
relevant legislation protected. 156 Similarly, in Friends of the Sha-
wangunks, Inc. v. Clark/57 the plaintiff was an environmental group 
with members who lived in the affected area. 158 Living near land 
burdened by a conservation easement was sufficient to provide the 
group with standing to protest the easement's proposed amend-
ment. 159 
Another possible legal problem with the Legacy Program's ease-
ments is a landowner's request to amend the easement's terms. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit treated this 
issue as a novel question on appeal in Friends of Shawangunks. 160 
The circuit court reversed a lower court's ruling that had upheld a 
decision by the Department of the Interior. 161 
The Department of the Interior had permitted a purchaser of land 
to modify the conservation easement that encumbered the land. 162 
150 [d. 
151 [d. See also Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238, 244-45 (5th Cir. 
1967) (deprived state of hunting rights after U.S. condemned land). 
152 Nat'!. Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 606 F. Supp. 825,831 (D. Alaska 1984); see U.S. CONST. 
Art. III; 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). 
163 606 F. Supp. 825 (D. Alaska 1984). 
154 [d. at 832. 
155 [d. 
166 See id. at 831~2 (citing McMichael v. County of Napa, 709 F.2d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 
1983». 
167 585 F. Supp. 195 (N.D.N.Y.), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 754 F.2d 446 (1st 
Cir. 1985). 
168 [d. at 199. 
159 [d. 
160 754 F.2d 446, 447 (2d Cir. 1985). 
161 [d. 
162 [d. 
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The modification would have changed the area from private unde-
veloped land, on which public access was not allowed, to a golf course 
providing access to members of the course. 163 The court acknowl-
edged that although it must defer to an agency's interpretation of 
its own statute, the purpose of the statute clearly was to preserve 
wilderness areas. l64 Referring to the statutory mandates, the court 
decided that the amendment of the easement constituted a conver-
sion. 165 Thus, the court did not enforce agency's decision to permit 
the amendment. 166 
V. THE FOREST LEGACY PROGRAM'S PROBLEMS AND 
POSSIBILITIES 
The Legacy Program is a fairly innovative program of environ-
mental conservation. The Legacy Program's novelty stems from its 
use of conservation easements for large scale conservation pur-
poses. 167 Most previous easements simply protected the natural state 
of property surrounding publicly owned lands or preserved the view 
along a highway.168 To succeed, the Legacy Program requires coor-
dination among several states and the federal governmenV69 to per-
form what traditionally has been a local function. 170 
The Legacy Program has three primary goals. First, the Legacy 
Program seeks to preserve the environmental values of the forest 
lands.171 Second, it attempts to preserve the heritage of private 
ownership and industrial productivity of the forests.172 Third, the 
Legacy Program aims to foster cooperation among the various par-
ties concerned about the forests' fate. 173 The Legacy Program's goals 
are difficult because the program tries to attain the benefits of pre-
servation and private ownership without suffering the corresponding 
163 [d. 
164 [d. at 449. 
165 [d. at 451. 
166 [d. at 452. 
167 See Hamilton, supra note 119, at 485. 
168 See Roe, supra note 16, at 431; U.S. DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY FOR FISH AND WILDLIFE AND PARKS, NEW TOOLS FOR LAND PROTECTION 32-
33 (1982). 
169 See Forest Service, Final Guidelines, supra note 76, at 1, 7. 
170 See Delogu, supra note 21, at 261-64; supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text. 
171 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(c)(1988). 
172 Forest Service, Final Guidelines, supra note 76, at 1. 
173 See S. 2427, 101st Congo 2d Sess. (1990) (a bill to provide for the establishment of a 
coordinated and cooperative federal state and local forest program). 
1993] FOREST LEGACY PROGRAM 525 
burdens of public acquisition and deforestation. 174 The Legacy Pro-
gram is an important, although inadequate, program to secure the 
future of the Northern Forest. Federally funded conservation ease-
ments can playa key role in limiting development of the forests, but 
they are neither a panacea, as some Legacy Program supporters 
might claim,175 nor a sign of the apocalypse, as property rights 
advocates may fear.176 
A. The Voluntary Nature of the Forest Legacy Program 
One of the most problematic aspects of the Legacy Program is the 
government's inability to purchase the development rights it values 
most. The USFS will determine the areas in which it is willing to 
purchase development rights according to the land's vulnerablility 
to environmental degradation.177 The USFS will then purchase de-
velopment rights from willing sellers who own land within the des-
ignated region.178 
Because participation in the Legacy Program is entirely volun-
tary,179 the USFS may need to offer high prices for development 
rights. These prices must meet not only the value of the land's 
development rights, but also the landowner's perception of the value 
of the land's development rights. 180 Demand for development in for-
est areas is steady and likely to increase over time. 181 Thus, the 
value of development rights may be a high percentage of the fair 
market value of the entire parcel of land. 182 
In addition, landowners who own fragile land may not be the most 
likely to sell because there is no guarantee that willing sellers will 
own the most environmentally significant parcels. Thus, it is impor-
tant to examine which owners may be most interested in participat-
ing in the Legacy Program. 
174 See supra notes 11-27 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text. 
176 See supra notes 86-105 and accompanying text. 
177 16 U.S.C. § 2103(c)(a); Forest Service, Final Guidelines, supra note 76, at 4. 
178 See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text; Forest Service, Final Guidelines, supra 
note 76, at 11. 
179 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(c) (1988)(places emphasis on fact that participating landowners shall 
be "willing"). 
180 See F. Christian Zinkhan, Option Pricing and Timberland's Land-Use Conversion Op-
tion, 67 LAND ECON. 317, 317 (1991). 
181 Austin, supra note I, at 3 (reporting that development rights may cost from 50% to 70% 
of full purchase price). 
182 Kukka, supra note 15, at 22. 
526 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 20:507 
Landowners who want to participate probably will be owners who 
intend to remain on their land for the foreseeable future. l83 The 
Legacy Program is likely to appeal primarily to those industrial 
landowners who are not in dire financial straits and do not envision 
needing to sell their property.l84 Industrial participants probably 
would plan to remain in the same field of business without changing 
the use of their land. 185 
For example, a paper company could be a likely participant in the 
Legacy Program. Because cutting timber is not inconsistent with a 
forest use under the Legacy Program's standards,186 a paper com-
pany could receive compensation for rights it was not planning to 
exploit and still keep the land for the sanctioned practices it wants 
to conduct. 187 Furthermore, granting a Legacy Program easement 
decreases the value of the land thus reducing the owner's property 
tax obligations. l88 A likely participant would believe that the tax 
break plus the compensation for the easement outweighs the costs 
of foregoing future development options plus the risks of unantici-
pated restrictions arising as a result of owning federally affiliated 
land. 
Larger, more diversified corporate landowners probably will be 
more willing to participate in the Legacy Program than smaller 
businesses or less stable landowners. 189 Thus, the owners most likely 
to participate are those owners who are least likely to need the 
benefits of the Legacy Program in order to maintain stable manage-
ment of their forest land holdings. 
Private-individual landowners are more likely than industrial land-
owners to want to participate in the Legacy Program. These land-
owners typically participate in private land trust organizations. 190 
The altruistic goal of preserving open spaces and the prospect of 
being compensated for development rights that they were not plan-
ning to use are primary motivations for individual land holders to 
enroll their land in conservation easement programs. 191 
Ironically, although the primary target of the Legacy Program 
seems to be corporate landowners who are considering the option of 
188 [d. 
184 See id.(noting decrease in resale value of land burdened by conservation easement). 
185 See id.(expressing some conservationists' concern that conservation easements may only 
serve as a subsidy to paper industry). 
186 Forest Service, Final Guidelines, supra note 76, at 1. 
187 16 U. S. C. § 2lO3c(h)(1) (1988). 
188 See Hamilton, supra note lO9, at 518. 
189 Andrews, supra note 45, at 37. 
190 See Austin, supra note 1, at 3. 
191 DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 106, at 37-38. 
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selling land to developers, these landowners are likely to be the least 
willing to participate. Industry's first purpose generally is to make 
a profit for its shareholders. Corporate landowners may care about 
the land the corporation owns, but a corporation may lack altruistic 
motives for land conservation. In addition, knowing how land values 
fluctuate, corporate landowners tend to feel the need to remain 
flexible in the face of difficult economic times. 192 They are unlikely 
to want to tie up their options for land use in perpetuity. Once a 
company sells the easement at fair market value, it loses the oppor-
tunity to benefit from future increases in the value of unrestricted 
land. 
Industrial landowners may also hesitate to enter into long-term 
easement agreements with the federal government because of po-
tential restrictions and complications involving federal land manage-
ment. 193 For example, landowners are concerned that if they sell the 
federal government an easement on their land, their logging or 
industrial activity may lead to litigation over Endangered Species 
Actl94 or National Environmental Policy Actl95 standards. l96 The 
federal government has assured prospective sellers that no such 
hazard exists. 197 This concern, however, may hamper landowners' 
willingness to participate in the Legacy Program. 198 
Alone, the Legacy Program probably will not attain its goal of 
preserving the ecological value of the forests. Sophisticated corpo-
rate landowners, who are not desperate for short term financial help, 
are unlikely to forego the benefits of retaining full title of their land 
in exchange for the current value of the land's development rights. 
Corporate landowners who may need the financial help the Legacy 
Program offers may prefer to sell their land to private developers 
and avoid the burdens of maintaining the land. 
A final aspect that might deter a corporate landowner from par-
ticipating in the Legacy Program is the free-rider problem. The 
demand for development in these forest areas is steady and likely 
to increase over time. 199 If all but one of the landowners in a certain 
192 See Andrews, supra note 45, at 37. 
193 Id. at 38-39. 
194 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988). 
195 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988). 
196 Id. Both acts establish requirements federal actors, but not private actors, must meet. 
197Id. at 39; Forest Service, Final Guidelines, supra note 76, at 2. 
198Id. at 37. 
199 Austin, supra note 1, at 3; David C. Smith, Large Land Holdings and the North Woods: 
Stasis-or-Changing Times, in CONSERVING THE NORTH WOODS: ISSUES IN PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF FORESTED LANDS IN NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND AND NEW YORK, 
supra note 56, at 58-59. 
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region participated in the Legacy Program, the value of the remain-
ing owner's land might skyrocket because it would be the only 
acreage available. If all of the landowners were to consider this 
possibility, none would participate in the Legacy Program because 
of the opportunity to reap the disproportionately higher value of the 
unrestricted land. Moreover, given the USFS's current policy 
against condemning land,20o the Legacy Program administrators 
would be powerless to compel the surrender of development rights, 
even in the most crucial areas. 
The differences between individual and industrial forest landown-
ers may defeat the Legacy Program's preservation goals. For a 
forest system to remain ecologically viable, it must be fairly large.201 
Alone, the Legacy Program's impact will be spotty and unplanned, 
restricted by inadequate funding and the availability of willing land-
owners. Industrial reticence may compound the problem because of 
the sheer size of corporate holdings. 202 
The Legacy Program likely will have a negligible impact on pre-
serving the Northern Forest. While it will help promote conservation 
by funding more easements than private land trust organizations 
can afford to purchase, it will not prompt people to use their land 
any differently than they otherwise would have. Small-tract partic-
ipants probably would not develop their land regardless of the ease-
ment program and large-tract holders are less likely to be enticed 
and more likely to contemplate selling the land to developers. The 
massive size of such tracts increases the impact of their decisions on 
the region's ecology. The Legacy Program's inability to induce these 
landowners to participate in selling conservation easements may 
defeat the program's purpose in preserving the forests' ecological 
values. 
B. Coordination Among Local, State, and Federal Governments 
The Forest Legacy Program, and the NFLC provide an oppor-
tunity for cooperation among the different interests involved in the 
fate of the Northern Forest; its success, however, faces strong chal-
200 See Forest Service, Final Guidelines, supra note 76, at 1-2; Andrews, supra note 45, at 
40. 
201 See Thomas A. Lepisto, Nationally Significant Values, THE No. FOREST ADVOC., 
Winter, 1992, at 2 (quoting Drew Barton, forest ecologist); FOREST SERVICE, Critical Land 
Must Be ldentified to Protect It, NORTHERN FOREST LANDS STUDY REPORT SUMMARY, supra 
note 5, at 18. 
202 See NORTHERN FOREST LANDS STUDY REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 5, at 12. 
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lenges. For example, the property rights advocates who complain 
about the lack of state and local input into the Legacy Program 
display a fundamental disagreement with the Legacy Program's 
goals.203 Congress enacted the Legacy Program because the N orth-
ern Forest has national and public values worth preserving.204 State 
and local regulations had been inadequate in the face of pressure for 
development to protect the national interest in forest resources. 205 
Thus, the federal government decided to intervene at a modest level. 
A substantial increase in state or local influence over the Legacy 
Program will result in a duplication of the programs, standards, and 
regulations that existed before the Legacy Program. Thus, the Leg-
acy Program would become even less effective and innovative than 
it is in its current form. 
The addition of the New York home rule amendment to the Legacy 
Program displays the difficulty the Legacy Program may face in 
becoming an effective program.206 Annual budget renewals will give 
opponents of the Legacy Program opportunities to organize and to 
tie funding of the Legacy Program to similar home-rule amendments 
for their regions. Thus, a municipality that does not want the Legacy 
Program has ample opportunities to deny an individual the choice of 
whether to participate in the program. In New York, if a community 
does not approve the Legacy Program then it is able to superimpose 
its local land-use agenda over the national interest in forest preser-
vation. On the other hand, if a community does approve the Legacy 
Program, the program is consistent with its values and simply pro-
vides federal funds to support the goals the local community would 
have pursued anyway. These scenarios highlight the emptiness of 
the Legacy Program's potential to act as an innovative tool for 
national land use goals if a local government has veto power. 
c. Other Ideas For Meaningful Forest Preservation 
As demonstrated by the Diamond Land turnover,207 the Northern 
Forest is undergoing a period of change; the New England states 
alone have been unable, or unwilling, to impede the economic de-
velopment that looms in the forest's future. Congress made a legis-
003 See supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text. 
006 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. 
206 Forest Service, Final Guidelines, supra note 76, at 5; see supra note 69 and accompanying 
text. 
207 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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lative decision, through the Northern Forest Land Study and the 
pilot Forest Legacy Program, that this eastern wilderness provides 
a benefit to the nation as a whole and warrants federal attention. 
The Forest Legacy Program alone, however, is inadequate to meet 
the legislative goals of maintaining the Northern Forest's private 
ownership and ecological integrity. In order to attain these goals, 
the federal government must increase the amount of resources di-
rected at protecting the Northern Forest. Despite the concerns of 
private property rights advocates, the Legacy Program is not likely 
to take anyone's land without just compensation.208 The Legacy Pro-
gram should be used in conjunction with some state and local actions 
as part of a comprehensive plan for forest conservation. 
First, the federal government should acknowledge the national 
importance of the Northern Forest and take advantage of the eco-
nomic slow-down in the region by purchasing outright the most 
important parcels of land in the Northeast. This action can bring 
some parity between the amount of the land the federal government 
owns in the Northeast, as compared with the acreage it owns in the 
rest of the country. Second, Congress should authorize and fund the 
NFLC in order to facilitate coherent action among the Northern 
Forest states. Third, Congress should overturn the troublesome 
New York amendment which threatens to burden implementors of 
the Legacy Program with even more bureaucratic duties to the 
detriment of the forest's health. Finally, Congress must give suffi-
cient funding to the Forest Legacy program so that it can purchase 
enough conservation easements to make an impact on the ecology of 
the region. 
At the state level, governments should identify and assess the 
most environmentally important areas of their states and increase 
their purchase of tracts to encourage large-scale land protection. 
State and local governments should work together to develop better 
land use and zoning policies to allow growth that is deliberate, well-
planned, and sensitive to environmental concerns. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Forest Legacy Program is an innovative solution to the prob-
lem of saving the Northern Forest. The Legacy Program responds 
208 Forest Service, Final Guidelines, supra note 76, at 1-2. 
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both to the need for preserving this national resource and to the 
political sensitivites of landowners in the region. Used properly, 
conservation easements can be an efficient tool to prevent excess 
development from marring forests in the Northeast. To be effective, 
however, the Legacy Program must receive adequate funding and 
be accompanied by complementary programs and policies. 
